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What do we learn about redistribution effects of pension systems from 
internationally comparable measures of Social Security Wealth? 
In most European countries social security is the prevailing form of insurance and 
assistance to protect the well-being of individuals at older ages1.  However, the increasing 
pressure to meet financial sustainability goals has hampered the action of many 
governments in reaching the desired level of coverage for retirees. The degree of old-age 
protection guaranteed by the social security system depends on a number of determinants: 
the institutional set-up and the rules in place, mortality prospects, labor force participation 
and indexation rules. The interaction of these forces may lead to different patterns of old-
age protection outcomes, which make it imperative to have access to a rich dataset where 
all these features can be measured and compared across countries in order to carry out 
meaningful comparisons. Old-age pension rules are often quite complex and could vary 
considerably over time and across countries, for instance in terms of eligibility rules or 
benefit computation rules. Hence, it is important to rely on a synthetic and flexible measure 
of the pension provisions that is able to capture all these different characteristics in a 
parsimonious way.   
                                                          
1 In this paper we use the terms “social security” and “public pensions” as synonymous. 
The difference between social security and pensions is relevant in those countries where 
private occupational pensions play a role, such as the Netherlands. However, since we 
focus our attention on the first pillar only, we can adopt this simplification. For those cases 




Redistribution aspects of pension systems are particularly relevant as the well-being of a 
large number of individuals may largely depend on public provisions during the retirement 
years. Yet, while there exists a vast literature on redistribution policies implemented 
through general taxation, much less has been done on the role of social security as a means 
of transferring resources, either intentionally or unintentionally. In recent years financial 
instability of “pay-as-you-go” first pillar funds led to significant reductions in the 
generosity of pension systems in Europe, furthermore many countries replaced Defined 
Benefit schemes with Defined Contribution schemes (also within the first pillar). These 
changes may have enhanced differences due to the former occupational status and job-
seniority of retirees, potentially boosting inequalities. 
In this paper we document the redistributive features of the public (first pillar) pension 
systems in several European countries by making use of a summary measure of Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) computed at the individual level. Our measure, is based on the 
definition used in Feldstein (1974), Stock and Wise (1990), and more recently in the 
volumes edited by Gruber and Wise (1998, 2004, 2007). 
We make use of the SHARE data (Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe), a 
longitudinal dataset based on a representative sample of individuals aged 50 or over living 
in Europe. The SHARE questionnaire collects extensive information on a variety of aspects 
relevant to describe individual well-being, ranging from health conditions to economic 
resources.  The estimate of SSW is obtained by combining individual-level information 
included in the third and the fourth waves of the survey. The third wave (SHARELIFE) 
collects retrospective information on the main events occurring during the lives of the 
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respondents, including their work histories, while the fourth wave collects information 
related to the time of the interview. 
While several studies have looked at the importance of Social Security for various 
dimensions of well-being at country level (see for example the different country-chapters 
of Gruber and Wise, 2004), very few authors have looked at a comprehensive study of the 
redistributive features of public pensions across Europe based on micro-data.  Indeed, the 
possibility to carry out a pan-European study of individual-level social security wealth and 
the redistribution effects of pension policies has been limited by the lack of appropriate 
and fully comparable data2. One exception in this vast literature is represented by the 
periodical report by the OECD “Pensions at a Glance” (OECD, 2009, 2011 and 2013) as it 
provides an international comparative analysis of the features of pension systems, 
including benefit calculation rules and distributional effects, based on a synthetic steady-
state population and steady-state pension rules. In particular, the OECD Report also 
presents a “progressivity index”, developed by Biggs et al. (2009) and based on inequality 
measures of SSW and earnings in order to assess the redistribution properties of Social 
Security Systems.  
In this paper we calculate a progressivity index, along the lines of what is proposed by the 
OECD Report, however our measure is based on the micro level data available in SHARE, 
which provides important advantages with respect to a synthetic population.  First, the 
                                                          
2 Important examples in close domains are Blau et al. (2006), Brandolini and Smeeding 
(2016) and Nolan et al. (2016). 
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heterogeneity of actual earnings histories (e.g. earnings volatility, unemployment spells 
and time out of the workforce) can interact with public pension benefit criteria and affect 
social security wealth. Second, we evaluate the redistributive features of pension systems 
on a lifetime (and not in a single time period) perspective and also we can assess the 
generosity of the different pension systems in relation to different sections of the earnings 
distribution. By constructing the ratio between SSW and lifetime income, we investigate 
whether and how the different pension systems protect the welfare of low lifetime earners. 
Finally, we look – in a descriptive way – at the possible displacement effects of social 
security on private wealth by plotting, for different countries, the share of social security 
wealth over a comprehensive measure of wealth that aggregates total private wealth and 
social security wealth. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the definition of our relevant 
measure of SSW and present the SHARE data, explaining how the information available 
at the individual level in SHARE can be used to generate SSW. Section 3 discusses the 
properties of the social security wealth estimates by making use of simple descriptive 
statistics while Section 4 analyses the redistribution properties of the different pension 
systems. Section 5 exploits the SHARE micro-data to study the degree of generosity of 
SSW along the lifetime labour income distribution of individuals. Section 6 investigates 
how SSW correlates with private household wealth and hints to a possible “substitutability” 
mechanism between these two forms of wealth. Section 7 provides some concluding 
remarks.  
Estimating Social Security Wealth in the SHARE sample  
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This paper is based on a summary measure of the generosity of the social security system 
known as social security wealth (SSW) that has been widely used to deal with several 
research questions in pension economics, such as retirement behavior (see, e.g. Stock and 
Wise 1990), the crowding out of private savings (Gale, 1998; Attanasio and Brugiavini, 
2003; Kapteyn et al., 2005, Alessie et al 2013), and as a general measure of the implicit 
liabilities of a government vis-à-vis its current and future retirees (Holzmann et al., 2004).  
Although the original concept of SSW dates back to the seminal paper of Feldstein (1974) 
and is quite general, more recent contributions offer operational definitions that may vary 
substantially, especially if applied at the individual or household level.  In this paper we 
develop an internationally comparable measure of individual SSW based on the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The SSW measure includes first pillar 
pension benefits plus minimum pension benefits (guaranteed flat benefits) when relevant, 
it does not include survivor benefits, it is based on pension benefits net of income and 
payroll taxes, and it is measured in 2010 Euros3.  
Two specifications of SSW are typically adopted in the literature, depending on the 
individual’s labor market status at the time of the interview. We stick to this literature and 
define the SSW of retired respondents (retired from the labor market) as follows: 
                                                          
3 All monetary in this paper values have been adjusted to take into account differences in 
the cost of living across countries by using purchasing power parity 2010 indexes. As a 
result, monetary values are expressed in 2010 “German” euros, i.e. the unit of measure is 
the quantity of goods that it was possible to buy in Germany with 1 € in 2010. 
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𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
Ω
𝑗=𝑅 𝜋(𝑗|𝑎)(1 + 𝑟)
𝑎−𝑗       (1) 
where i is the individual, R is her/his age at the time of retirement, Ω is the maximum 
attainable age, a is her/his age at the time of the interview (a>R), 𝜋(. ) are conditional 
survival probabilities according to current life tables4 and r is a financial discount rate. P 
is the self-reported public old age/early retirement pension benefit annualized and net of 
pension income taxation. The retirement age R is also self-reported (in case of missing 
values, for panel individuals it is recovered from previous waves). Conditional survival 
probabilities π are taken from the Human Mortality Database (HMD, 2013) and are country 
and gender-specific, the maximum attainable age is set to 109. The discount rate r is set to 
2 percent as in OECD (2013).  
The SSW of individuals who are still working at the time of the interview is defined as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑖 = ∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑗(𝑅)
Ω
𝑗=𝑅 𝜋(𝑗|𝑎)(1 + 𝑟)
𝑎−𝑗      (2) 
where ?̂?(𝑅) is the computed public pension benefit from work, which can be either an early 
or an old age retirement benefit, according to whichever comes first in terms of eligibility. 
We assume that individuals work until they meet the eligibility requirements (age, 
insurance and contribution years) and they retire from work through one of these routes as 
soon as they qualify. The computed public pension benefit is defined according to the early 
retirement rules if the respondent’s current age is lower than or equal to the early retirement 
                                                          
4 Since we know that the individual survived until the interview year, we set 𝜋(𝑗|𝑎) equal 
to 1 for j=R,...,a. 
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age 𝑅𝑒 in place in her country of residence. Otherwise, the pension benefit is computed 
according the rules of old age pensions. More formally, we can write 
?̂?𝑖(𝑅) = {
?̂?𝑖
𝑒(𝑅𝑒) if a ≤ 𝑅𝑒
?̂?𝑖
𝑜(𝑅𝑜) if a > 𝑅𝑒
 
Where e stands for early retirement and o stands for old age. The pension benefit is 
measured in yearly amounts net of pension income taxation.  Old age/early retirement age, 
R, is an institutional “contextual” variable that depends on country-specific pension 
legislation, while maximum attainable age, survival probabilities and the discount rate are 
defined as in the case of the retirees presented above. We use country specific pension 
regulations on the relevant variables in order to construct an eligibility index5.  
Data are taken from the SHARE survey, a multidisciplinary, cross-national longitudinal 
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family networks. 
The SHARE sample is representative of the populations of individuals aged 50 or over 
living in 20 European countries (plus Israel)6 and their spouses. Six waves of SHARE are 
currently available. The first two and the last three waves focus on the status of respondents 
at the time of the interview. The third wave (SHARELIFE) is a retrospective survey that 
uses life-history interviews to gather information about the main events occurred 
                                                          
5 See Belloni et al. (2016) for an alternative measure of Social Security Wealth based on 
the same data. 
6 See Börsch-Supan et al. (2013a and 2013b) and Malter and Börsch-Supan (2013) for more 
information on the SHARE data. 
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throughout respondents’ lives with respect to family relationships, employment, health 
status, health care and housing7. Our sample consists of individuals who are interviewed in 
both the Wave 4 of SHARE, which has been mainly collected in 2011, and in SHARELIFE, 
which has been collected between 2008 and 2009. 
The distinction between workers and retirees is based on a question present in the fourth 
wave of SHARE, asking about the current status in terms of activities. Information on 
pension benefit, necessary to compute SSW as in equations (1) and (2), is obtained in 
different ways for retirees and for workers, respectively. In the former case the pension 
benefit (as well as the retirement age) is observed in the data and can be readily 
incorporated into the definition of SSW. In particular, the relevant question asks about a 
typical - after taxes - payment of public old age/early retirement pension in the previous 
year. The benefit amount is a typical regular payment, excluding any extra payments and 
bonuses.  For workers, the future pension amount they will receive at retirement needs to 
be computed. This is a complex task since pension benefit computation rules are country 
specific. We rely on Mutual Information System on Social Protection tables (MISSOC, 
version July 2010) to define the appropriate pension rules for each country, plus 
information obtained directly from country specific publications. This calculation often 
requires the reconstruction of the individual working life as well as of the contribution rates 
and pension rules. Retrospective individual data like wage history, insurance and 
contribution years and/or residential information needed to compute the pension benefit 
                                                          
7 See Börsch-Supan et al. (2011) and Schröder (2011) for more information on the contents 
and the methodology of the life-history interviews conducted in the SHARELIFE surveys. 
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have been mainly obtained from the Job Episodes Panel (JEP). The JEP is a dataset based 
on SHARELIFE and it runs until 2008. It is a retrospective panel dataset in which 
respondents contribute  as  many  observations  as  their years  of  age  at  the  moment  of  
the SHARELIFE interview. This panel stores information about the lifetime evolution  of  
respondents’ working  conditions,  ranging  from labor  market  status  to  wages  and  job 
specific characteristics.8 Specifically, the JEP reports the following types of wages: first 
wage for each working spell, the last wage of the main job for retirees and the current wage 
for individuals still at work in 2010.  In order to construct a complete age-earnings profile 
we need to do some form of back-casting and fill in within spell missing wages in the past, 
at the same time we have to forecast and project future wages after 2010. As for the former 
we apply a simple piece-wise linear interpolation which generates a spline with different 
rates of growth in the different spells, while for future wages in order to generate a 
prediction after the last observation in 2010,  we project constant wages in real terms. This 
is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Gruber and Wise 2004) as at older ages 
observed wages may fall for a number of reasons which generate a spurious decline of the 
age-earnings profile. In our sample the only cases where this might turn out to be an 
extreme assumption is for workers who are relatively young (say age 50) in the year 2010, 
but there are very few respondents falling in this category. The pension rules considered to 
compute the public old age/early retirement pension benefits are those in place in 2010 and 
are drawn from the MISSOC tables and country-specific publications to fully account for 
                                                          
8 See Brugiavini et al. (2013) for more details. 
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the heterogeneity in pension legislation across cohorts, gender and current employment 
status.  
In estimating SSW we neglect some dimensions of the pension systems: we do not account 
for survivors’ benefits and we do not model the second or third pillar. Although in some 
cases the role of occupational pensions may be relevant (especially in Sweden, The 
Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, among the countries considered in our analysis, 
see Table A1 in the Appendix), in this paper we want to describe the provisions that 
individuals are entitled to in terms of first-pillar social security as this is normally under 
the direct control of the State and therefore is the natural policy instrument to redistribute 
resources.9 
Our analysis is based on individuals living in the following twelve European countries: 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, 
Spain, Italy, Poland and Czech Republic. Estonia, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia also 
participated to the fourth wave of SHARE, but did not take part to the third wave of SHARE 
(SHARELIFE) and we had to exclude them from the investigation. We also excluded 
SHARE respondents residing in any of the twelve countries who did not participate to the 
retrospective wave SHARELIFE or respondents displaying missing values in any of the 
                                                          
9 The arrangements concerning survivor benefits are often complex and subject to earning-
tests: to properly compute these benefits a set of additional institutional-level information 
would be required. Even more complex is the structure of second pillar pensions 
(occupational pensions), as there might be many types of occupational pensions within the 
same country.  
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relevant variables10. Furthermore, we excluded individuals aged 80 and above in 2010, this 
is because older pensioners in our sample may have retired at very different ages and may 
have experienced several pension regimes, hence the comparison based on SSW may be 
largely affected by sample composition as well as differences in mortality for these cohorts.  
Finally, we select the sample of retirees who enjoyed lifetime earnings and SSW above the 
first decile of their respective distributions. This is because we are not interested in 
describing redistributive policies which are not strictly related to the work experience. In 
several countries a retiree who has never worked might qualify for pension benefits, hence 
giving rise to a very high degree of redistribution of the pension system, which is in fact 
due to a general poverty relief program, often financed through taxation rather than 
contributions. We rather focus on workers and retirees who did in fact contribute to the 
social security system, as to highlight the redistribution properties within the program.  
The analysis is carried out separately by gender and working status (distinguishing between 
workers and retirees). Indeed, historical differences in labor market participation and in 
earnings-profiles between males and females as well as gender differences in pension rules, 
provide a strong argument in favor of splitting the sample by gender. Furthermore, as 
discussed earlier, in estimating SSW for retirees we rely on self-reported pension benefits 
which were collected in the fourth wave of SHARE, while for workers we compute 
pensions on the basis of individuals’ working career information collected in SHARELIFE 
                                                          
 10 To limit the presence of outliers in the monetary variables used throughout the paper we 




and apply country-specific pension rules prevailing in 2010. The final sample contains 
2,683 workers and 5,978 retirees11. 
Social Security Wealth in Europe: descriptive statistics   
SHARE is the ideal dataset to study the redistributive features of social security systems 
across Europe since it is based on exactly the same set of questions and the same wording 
in all countries. Table 1 reports the number of individuals by country, gender and labor 
market status at the time of the interview (workers vs. retirees) included in our final 
sample.12 The number of retirees is much higher than the number of workers due to the 
reference population of the SHARE sample, consisting of individuals aged 50 or over and 
their spouses.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 2 reports the sample size by cohort, gender and labor market status at the time of the 
interview. As pointed out earlier, we selected individuals born between 1930 and 1960 (i.e. 
respondents aged 50 to 80 in 2010).  
                                                          
11 As stated, we rely on self-reported benefits for retired individuals: this is the most reliable 
information for this group of individuals in SHARE, as we do not have access to 
administrative data and we avoid making use of estimates of pension benefits based on 
past pension rules. 
12 In all Tables and Figures, we list countries based on their geographical latitude, basically 
from the North to the South of Europe, in order to provide an immediate visualization of 
possible geographical gradients.   
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TABLE 2 HERE 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of our SSW measure by gender and working status. As 
expected, the SSW distribution has a long right tail, but a clear difference emerges between 
the distribution for workers and the distribution for retirees (both males and females). The 
distribution for retirees is more densely populated and smoother than in the case of workers, 
the right tail reaches very high values of SSW. The distribution for workers is sparse and  
displays a number of spikes in focal points. This is because we observe fewer workers than 
retired individuals: the values of SSW which stick out correspond to the legislated 
minimum pension benefits or to uniform pension benefits of one specific country, as it is 
the case for Denmark or the Netherlands.  Figures 1 and 2 do not immediately reveal the 
determinants of the observed dispersion in SSW, three factors surely play a role: pension 
rules, heterogeneity in earnings and the length of the working careers.  
FIGURE 2 and TABLE 3 HERE 
Figure 2 shows the box plots of SSW in the four samples of interest by country, working 
status and gender, while Table 3 reports the corresponding medians. As reported above, all 
monetary amounts considered in the paper have been PPP-adjusted so that they are fully 
comparable across countries. Stark differences in the level of median SSW emerge across 
countries: Poland has the lowest median SSW for male workers, around 63,000€, which is 
due to both low annual pension benefits and low life expectancy (male life expectancy at 
the age of old-age eligibility 65 is 14.69 years). Austria is the only country where the 
median SSW is above 300,000€. All the other countries lie in-between and show median 
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SSW values around 200,000€. A similar ranking is observed for female workers, except 
for Germany and Belgium, which score (much) worse than in the case of male workers.  
In terms of variability, figures for males and female workers highlight a clear dichotomy. 
A first group includes Denmark, The Netherlands and Switzerland showing a very small 
interquartile range: for the first two countries the bulk of individuals reaches full residential 
requirements for the (flat) pension at the retirement age, for Switzerland most workers’ 
accrued pensions at retirement are limited to the maximum pension which was set rather 
low for the first pillar in 2010. Also Poland and the Czech Republic display a limited range 
of SSW while the remaining countries are characterized by a marked variation in SSW.   
It is harder to identify a pattern across countries according to the median level of SSW in 
the case of retirees. This result is likely due to the reforms of the pension systems that the 
cohorts included in the sample of retirees were exposed to: this heterogeneity mechanically 
generates a wide variability for unconditional summary measures. Hence, caution should 
be taken in the interpretation of results based on median values, however some meaningful 
comparisons can be proposed. Table 3 shows that median SSW for workers is noticeably 
lower than for retirees in various countries, including Poland (-55% for males, -43% for 
females), Germany (around -30%), Belgium (-43% for females), Denmark (-45%), Czech 
Republic (about -30%) and in Switzerland (-60% for males and -55% for females). This 
evidence suggests that these countries recently enacted significant pension reforms aimed 
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at curtailing public spending.13 It should be recalled that our measure of SSW is based on 
old-age and early retirement public (first pillar) pension only.  
Inequality and progressivity of social security  
One objective of our study is to highlight how differences in SSW across countries may 
reflect differences in the generosity of the social security systems (including minimum 
pensions), as well as differences in lifetime earning profiles. The interplay between these 
features is embedded in the pension formula: for instance, in the Netherlands, the first pillar 
benefit (AOW) depends mostly on residential life histories and does not depend on earning 
life histories (Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999). At the other extreme, the German social security 
provisions (“earnings points system”, Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2006) are fully based on 
lifetime relative earnings. In this section we will use SHARE data to assess to what extent 
the cross-country differences in SSW dispersion previously documented are a result of 
cross-country differences in the volatility of lifetime earnings or they reflect different 
architectures of the pension system in each country. Disentangling these two sources of 
heterogeneity is essential to understand the contribution of the pension systems in shaping 
within-country SSW inequality. 
                                                          
13 When comparing SSW of workers and retirees, it should be kept in mind that 
heterogeneity in pension legislation may also exist within these two groups (e.g. 
younger cohorts of retirees may have been affected by changes in pension rules 
differently from older cohorts). 
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Besides presenting descriptive evidence on social security wealth, which is interesting per 
se, we want to measure in a simple way the degree of redistribution present in Europe 
which can be explained by the social security system carrying out comparisons across 
countries and within each country. In order to provide this type of evidence for pension 
provisions we make use of well-known measures such as the Gini coefficient (G-index), 
computed at the country-gender-working status level and based on individual estimates of 
social security wealth. However, the observed inequality in SSW among countries and 
groups as measured by the G-index can be due both to heterogeneity in the institutional 
characteristics of social security systems and to differences in the lifetime earnings 
distribution. Hence, we also consider a measure of lifetime resources such as lifetime 
income (LTI). This measure should provide a full life-course perspective of inequality and 
control for individual resources by distinguishing the lifetime-rich from the lifetime-poor 
individuals. Following Biggs et al. (2009) and the OECD (2009, 2011, 2013), we also 
consider a progressivity index, which is designed to capture the redistribution within the 
system from high-earners to low-earners.  
Country-level measures of inequality In order to provide cross-country evidence on 
inequalities in pension provisions we make use of the G-index based on our estimates of 
SSW at the individual level, computed separately by country, gender and working status. 
Although our approach is similar to the exercise carried out by the OECD (2009, 2011, 
2013), there are relevant differences. We focus our analysis on an estimate of SSW 
computed at the individual level for a sample of real individuals obtained from micro data: 
the selected individuals are SHARE-respondents at a given point in time, hence 
encompassing a large set of cohorts – part of which are still at work and part are already 
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retired at the time of the interview. As a result, our individuals are subject to different 
pension rules, both between cohorts and within the same cohort. Plus, we make use of 
country-specific and gender-specific life expectancy rather than a population-wide life 
expectancy. Another important difference is that while we consider separately workers and 
retirees and measure actual SSW (as detailed below), the OECD computes total SSW for a 
continuous career in the workplace (baseline scenario) referring to a “representative” 
individual of the population in one specific country for a steady-state “virtual” population. 
Finally, it should be stressed that our estimate of SSW for workers is a lower bound because 
we project the age-earnings profile making simplifying and conservative assumptions on 
these profiles and because we do not take account of other provisions on top of old age or 
early retirement benefits, while the OECD takes into account compulsory pensions also 
from the second pillar. 
We exploit information from the third wave of SHARE (SHARELIFE), which reports 
retrospective wages along the working history to compute individual Life-Time Income 
(LTI). This is defined as the total capitalized sum of annualized earnings received over the 
whole working history, expressed in 2010 euros14. We argue that LTI is a meaningful 
indicator to summarize individual’s position in the lifetime earnings distribution as it 
standardizes earnings with respect to the entire working history. It is however a first- 
moment summary measure capturing both the length of the career of individuals and the 
level of earnings in each year. So an individual could have a high LTI either because he 
                                                          
14  For capitalization and discounting labour income, we use the same value of the interest 
rate adopted for SSW. 
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has high earnings over a short career or because he has somewhat lower earnings over a 
long career.  
FIGURE 3 HERE 
Figure 3 reports the distribution of LTI by gender and employment status. As in the case 
of SSW, the distribution is skewed with a rather long right tail, especially for retirees.   
TABLE 4 HERE 
Results on the measures of inequality are reported in Table 4, where we present the G-
coefficient for SSW, for LTI, and the progressivity index. The latter is designed to 
summarize in a single value the extent of the redistribution properties embedded in the 
social security system rules. It provides a natural ranking of pension systems in terms of 
redistributive properties: when social security redistributes resources from higher- to 
lower-earning groups it is regarded as progressive. The progressivity index is defined as 
follows:  




where 𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑊 and 𝐺𝐿𝑇𝐼 stand for the G-index of the SSW and LTI distribution respectively. 
The lower the inequality in SSW compared to the inequality in lifetime income, the higher 
is the progressivity of the pension system and the higher the progressivity index. It varies 
from 1 in pure flat schemes (maximum redistribution) to less than zero for highly regressive 
pension systems. In order to correctly interpret the progressivity index, one has to take into 
account that the same pension system can be found to be more progressive/regressive in 
our data depending on the underlying income distribution to which pension rules are 
applied. Therefore, a meaningful comparison of the index across countries can be 
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performed for countries with similar values of the G-index for LTI, which is why we report 
the G-index performed on LTI as well. 
Table 4 shows the G-index of SSW for retirees and for workers (first four columns). It is 
characterized by a marked cross-country variability: a striking difference emerges for 
Austrian male workers vis-à-vis Danish, Dutch or Swiss workers. Cross-country 
heterogeneity in lifetime income inequality is also substantial, see columns 5 to 8 of Table 
4. These simple cross-country comparisons can provide some insight of the role played by 
the pension system architecture in shaping lifetime income inequality. Compare the case 
of male workers in Germany and in the Netherlands: The G-index for  LTI is basically the 
same (0.24 and 0.23 respectively) but the G-index (and thus inequality) in SSW is  
significantly higher in Germany (0.2) than in the Netherlands (0.02). As a result, the 
progressivity index for male workers is much higher in the Netherlands (=1-(0.02) /(0.23) 
=0.91)  than in Germany (=1-(0.2)/(0.24) =0.17). Conditioning on the same level of 
inequality in LTI, the Dutch pension system appears to be much more redistributive than 
the German one15: a results which is in line with the characteristics of the first pillar in the 
two pension systems. 
                                                          
15 We computed the relevant indexes also making use of ALTI (Average Lifetime Income), 
i.e. the capitalized sum of earnings divided by the number of year in work. The ALTI may 
generate a similar number for a low-wage worker who worked many years and a high-
earner who worked a few years. The distribution of ALTI is less dispersed than the 
distribution of LTI due to the fact that it averages variability in earnings and length of 
working career. As for the inequality measures the country ranking is preserved and our 
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FIGURE 4 HERE 
Figure 4 provides an attempt to compare at the country level the progressivity index we 
computed with the one published by the OECD (OECD, 2013). We already pointed out 
that several methodological differences exist between the two approaches and some 
differences in the results are likely to emerge.  In order to minimize these differences we 
only focus on the progressivity indexes for workers and average over genders. We then 
exclude three countries from the comparison: Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 
as these are the countries where the second pension pillar plays a major role and may 
drastically change the redistributive features of the social security system. The resulting 
correlation between the two series of progressivity index is equal to 0.64. If we further 
exclude Poland16, the correlation increases to 0.88 and the R2 of a regression predicting 
OECD progressivity index based on the progressivity index computed on our data reaches 
a value of 0.77.  
                                                          
results are confirmed. We also checked if the results were robust to the sample selection,   
and removed any trimming in the relevant measures: although differences are more 
dramatic, due to the massive redistribution taking place in favour of low-LTI individuals, 
the differences across countries and between groups of the population are preserved. 
16 In our sample most Polish workers are still under the old DB rules, whereas the OECD 
assumes that Polish workers are covered by the steady state Notionally Define 
Contribution system, which entails no redistribution. 
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Within-country measures of inequality. The analysis based on the progressivity index 
provides an overall country-level measure of redistribution (separately by gender and 
employment status) determined by the pension system. However, it is limited in scope as 
it does not provide information on which part of the earnings distribution is more affected 
by the public pension redistributive rules and it cannot be used to assess the extent to which  
the pension system of a given country protects individuals who are “lifetime poor” vis-à-
vis those who are “lifetime rich”.   
In order to provide a more accurate representation of inequality and to disentangle the 
“pension rules” effect from the “lifetime-earnings distribution” effect at the individual 
level, we propose a new simple index of Relative Social Security Wealth (RSSW) given 
by the ratio between Social Security Wealth (SSW) and Life Time Income (LTI): 
     RSSW= SSW/LTI 
Although the motivation is the same as for the progressivity index, we stress that in our 
analysis both measures are computed at the individual level, so that we obtain a measure 
of RSSW for everyone in the sample. 
We argue that RSSW can be informative of the redistributive features of the pension 
systems since it shows to what extent the SSW of an individual compares to the cumulative 
labor income she earned during her whole working career, which is positively related to 
the amount of contributions paid to the social security administration. The higher is the 
SSW of a worker relatively to her lifetime income, the higher is the generosity of the 
pension system for this worker.  The standardization of SSW with respect to LTI, both 
taken at the individual level, allows for a meaningful comparison of the “pension 
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generosity” between groups and across countries. However, one has to be cautious on the 
interpretation of the results as birth-cohorts and age affect SSW and LTI, i.e. both the 
numerator and denominator of RSSW. Our sample involves individuals from different 
birth-cohorts who might have been exposed to different pension regimes, which were often 
phased in according to age or year-of-birth of workers either by explicit design or simply 
because of the timing of maturity or vesting of benefits. Furthermore, individuals from 
different birth-cohorts might have faced different phases of the business cycle in different 
stages of their working careers producing cohort-differentials in their earnings age profiles. 
Since we are dealing with cross-sectional data we are limited in the ways we can 
disentangle birth-cohort from age effects, but we are aware of the fact that any in depth 
analysis of the determinants of RSSW should take them into account. Hence we carry out 
a regression analysis, which allows us to control for cohort dummies in order to filter out 
cohort/age effects. 
More specifically, we want to assess the redistributive properties of pension systems along 
the lifetime-income distribution of individuals. Our exercise is designed to document how 
the generosity of the pension rules varies with individual lifetime earnings and whether 
these rules are successful in granting higher level of protection to workers who are “lifetime 
poor”, i.e. workers whose LTI appears in the left tail of the distribution. To do this, we 
predict the median RSSW at each lifetime income quintile by performing a set of median 
regressions separately by country, gender and employment status (retirees/workers). The 
set of right-hand-side variables crucially includes a full set of lifetime income quintile 
dummies (quintiles are country- and group- specific) and a full set of cohort dummies, as 
defined in Table 2, to control for cohort/age effects. 
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FIGURE 5 HERE 
Figure 5 focuses on retirees and plots the fitted median and 95% confidence interval of  
RSSW (vertical axis) against quintiles of LTI by country and gender. The inspection of the 
graphs suggests the presence of three clusters of countries: a first set of countries includes 
Germany and Czech Republic, for which the fitted RSSW remains constant throughout the 
whole lifetime income range. A second cluster includes Denmark, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Spain and Poland exhibiting a declining trend along the whole LTI 
distribution. This suggests that the redistribution induced by their pension system is not 
entirely focused on the “lifetime poor” individuals but it also affects individuals with 
medium (lifetime) income levels. The third cluster includes the remaining countries, such 
as Sweden, in which we observe a sizeable drop in RSSW between the first and the second 
lifetime income quintile, while for the rest RSSW remains overall stable. 
FIGURE 6 HERE 
Figure 6 replicates the analysis for workers. We were forced to exclude Austria due to the 
low number of observations (see Table 1). Looking at the same grouping as above: the first 
cluster includes only Germany, for which fitted RSSW again remains constant over the 
whole lifetime income distribution. This finding suggests that for the birth-cohorts included 
in this study, the expected SSW of German workers varies proportionally with their 
lifetime income so that the same inequality observed in lifetime earnings is to a large extent 
reflected in pensions. The second cluster of countries includes Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Poland. In these countries, we observe a marked decline in RSSW between 
the first and the second quintile of lifetime income, but we also notice that RSSW decreases 
steadily for the following quintiles. For example, for female Danish workers, there is a 
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drop in the fitted RSSW from the fourth to the firth quintile by 43% (i.e. from fitted 
RSSW=0.07 to 0.04). The intent seems   to provide uniform pensions across the population 
(Figure 2 reports a small interquartile range for Poland). The third cluster includes the 
remaining countries where redistribution in Social Security Wealth is concentrated in the 
left-tail of the LTI distribution, with some special cases. For example the RSSW of Spanish 
workers exhibits a huge drop between the first and the second quintile (-68% for males) 
followed by a modest reduction at the higher quintiles (about -15% for each quintile 3 to 
5). In the case of Sweden, redistribution only occurs in favor of very poor individuals of 
both genders in the first quintile, while the same holds in France only for females. Most of 
the redistribution in this cluster derives from the existence of generous minimum pensions 
coupled by a pension formula implying a low or very low degree of redistribution. 
Social Security Wealth, Financial Wealth and Real Wealth 
In the previous sections we focused the attention on inequalities in a SSW measure based 
on first-pillar pensions. However, this is a partial view of the resources available to 
individuals and households, as it neglects private wealth holdings. In this section, we 
attempt an estimate of the correlation between SSW and private household wealth. 
Forward-looking agents who expect lower levels of SSW might have stronger incentives 
to save and cumulate private wealth in order to guarantee adequate standards of living 
during their retirement years (see, e.g., Alessie, Angelini, Van Santen, 2013; Attanasio and  
Brugiavini, 2003). This is a relevant point for policy makers since the design of Social 
Security Systems may result in a variety of household economic choices related to financial 
and real wealth investments, including participation to financial markets and home-
ownership. Households endowed with higher levels of SSW might be less prone to 
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participate in financial markets or to save in order to buy a house because they know that 
the wealth accrued in the Social Security System will be an effective safety net protecting 
their standard of living at older ages. In some countries, such as the UK, reductions in 
Social Security benefits are criticized on the grounds that such reductions will have a 
roughly one-for-one reduction in retirement incomes. Understanding how Social Security 
Wealth associates with private wealth accumulation can be of help to understand how 
individuals prepare to finance their consumption during retirement years. Some authors 
have discussed of an actual “displacement effect” of SSW on private wealth holdings or on 
the saving rate (Feldstein, 1974; Dicks-Mireaux and King, 1984; Attanasio and Brugiavini, 
2003; Blau, 2006).  
Whether SSW actually produces a displacement effect on financial and real wealth is an 
empirical issue that requires a comprehensive theoretical framework explicitly designed to 
model lifetime accumulation of private wealth, insurance contracts and old-age protection 
instruments. Such a complex model is beyond the scope of this paper, but even in this 
simplified framework we can exploit the detailed information provided by the Wave 4 of 
SHARE about household financial and real wealth to provide descriptive evidence about 
the relationship between SSW and private wealth of older European individuals. 
SHARE data contain household measures of net financial and real wealth. Net financial 
wealth is defined as the sum of money held by households in bank accounts, stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds and savings for long-term investments, net of financial liabilities. Net real 
wealth is the value of the main residence, of other real estates and of businesses, net of 
mortgages. Since financial and real wealth in SHARE are measured at the household level, 
their comparison with the SSW requires the latter to be defined at the household level as 
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well. We construct a household level measure of SSW that is defined as the sum over 
household members of individual SSW. We denote this measure of Household Social 
Security Wealth by HSSW. Note that in doing so we avoid double counting as our 
definition of SSW does not include survivors’ benefits and spousal benefits. We can think 
of our estimate of HSSW as a lower bound for the effective social security wealth available 
to the households. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 5 reports the quintiles of the sample distribution of the household level measures of 
SSW, real assets and financial assets. Amounts are expressed in thousands of 2010 euros 
for all countries and PPP-adjusted to account for country level differences in the cost of 
living17. In order to assess the association between HSSW and the level of financial and 
real wealth, we introduce a measure of total “augmented” household wealth as the sum of 
HSSW, financial wealth and real wealth measures. This definition allows us to compute 
the shares of private wealth and social security wealth in terms of the “augmented” total 
wealth.  
FIGURE 7 HERE 
In Figure 7 we plot the country-level averages of the share of total household wealth held 
in financial wealth against the corresponding share of social security wealth. To the extent 
                                                          
17 The sample selection operated in this part of the paper is the same as before:  in particular 




that the share of real wealth is not totally fixed, the association between these two 
components of wealth provides a prima facie suggestion of the likely underlying 
relationship. Although we cannot draw firm conclusions on the “substitutability” between 
the two forms of wealth, a negative cross-country gradient emerges.  The portfolio of 
Danish and Swiss households is characterized by low shares of HSSW and high shares of 
private financial wealth, at the other extreme, Austrian and Polish households seem to rely 
mostly on HSSW.  The simple evidence presented in Figure 7 prompts for a deeper and 
more elaborate model of household’s portfolio decision in terms of old-age insurance: the 
SHARE dataset lends itself to this type of further investigation because the researcher can 
control for the many confounding factors which affect household level data also 
retrospectively and exploit the variability in the different welfare systems in Europe.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the distribution of old-age resources for a large number of 
European countries by making use of the SHARE data. We present a novel estimate of 
Social Security Wealth (SSW), which is computed at the individual level based on the third 
and the fourth wave of SHARE data. Our SSW measure focuses on the first pillar of 
pension systems and provides a discounted sum of the pension benefits received from the 
retirement age to the end of the life-cycle, weighted by country- and gender- specific 
survival probabilities, based on alternative specifications for retirees and workers. While 
social security wealth for retirees is the stock-equivalent measure of observed benefits, we 
calculated the pension benefits of current workers by combining the individual-level 
retrospective data provided by SHARE about their age-earnings profiles and contribution 
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histories with information about the institutional details of the pension systems currently 
in place in their countries. Our SSW measure is an effective summary indicator of the 
resources that individuals could have access to in their old age through public pensions.  
Building upon this new measure, we are able to look at traditional inequality indexes: some 
countries show low median values of SSW but also very little variability over the possible 
range of values taken by the SSW, in particular Denmark and the Netherlands. At the other 
extreme we observe countries, such as Italy and Austria, where the dispersion of SSW is 
much higher. Cross-country and within-country differences in SSW inequality might 
depend on different architectures of the pension systems as well as on heterogeneity in 
individual characteristics, in particular the amount of earnings collected during the working 
career. In order to control for individual heterogeneity due to differences in lifetime 
earnings, we exploit the information from SHARE to compute individuals’ Life-Time 
Income (earnings) (LTI). We then compute a progressivity index along the lines of the 
OECD Reports (2009, 2011 and 2013) that compares inequality levels in Social security 
wealth and LTI in order to measure the degree of redistribution in SSW generated by the 
pension systems. Our exercise complements the traditional approach followed by OECD. 
While OECD computations are based on a “steady-state” population and steady-state 
pension rules, our SSW and LTI measures stem from real individual data, which present 
heterogeneity with respect to many dimensions relevant to the SSW computation, such as 
earnings history, working career length and pension system rules. This heterogeneity 
provides us with valuable information to understand the actual levels of redistribution 
produced by pension systems. 
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A refinement of this is to “anchor” our measure of SSW to the distribution of lifetime 
income. More precisely, we introduce a Relative Social Security Wealth (RSSW) measure, 
defined as the ratio of SSW over LTI, in the attempt to shed light on the redistributive 
features of pension systems controlling for the labor income over whole working career. In 
fact, LTI is positively related to the average amount of yearly contributions paid to the 
social security administration and could enter directly and indirectly into the pension 
formula. The higher is the SSW of a worker relatively to her average lifetime income 
earned (and the contributions paid), the higher is the generosity of the pension system for 
this worker. 
We present how the median RSSW ratio varies over the quintiles of average lifetime 
income. In Germany the RSSW ratio remains overall constant across lifetime income 
quintiles suggesting that the inequality found in lifetime earnings is maintained in Social 
Security Wealth. In other countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and 
Poland we observe that the redistribution is in favor of the “lifetime poorest” individuals, 
i.e. those in the first quintile of lifetime income distribution, is sizeable but it is still present 
at higher levels of lifetime income, while in Sweden the redistribution is strongly in favor 
of the lifetime poorest. 
Finally, we provide descriptive evidence of a household-level analysis of the association 
between social security and private wealth. We show that in those countries where the first 
pension pillar is relevant, the share of financial wealth is lower. Although we cannot draw 
firm causality conclusions on the displacement effect of SSW on private wealth, the 
negative correlation suggests that households who feel more protected by the welfare state 
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Table 1. Number of observations by country, gender and labor market status at the 
time of the interview (SHARE selected sample) 
Country Retirees Workers 
 Total Males Females Total Males Females 
SE 518 246 272 261 104 157 
DK 524 237 287 458 194 264 
DE 540 323 217 225 79 146 
NL 444 258 186 307 137 170 
BE 686 442 244 267 113 154 
FR 602 336 266 305 114 191 
CH 339 168 171 238 102 136 
AT 265 130 135 44 22 22 
ES 286 238 48 130 77 53 
IT 693 449 244 161 67 94 
CZ 539 195 344 152 71 81 
PL 542 256 286 135 65 70 
Total 5978 3278 2700 2683 1145 1538 
 
Table 2. Number of observations by cohort, gender and labor market status at the 
time of the interview (SHARE workers and retirees) 
 Retirees  Workers 






586 1935-1947 82 74 
1940-1944 984 822 1948-1950 245 223 
1945-1949 687 666 1951-1953 402 446 
1950-1956 173 248 1954-1956 372 541 





Table 3. SSW by country, working conditions and gender: median values 
 Retirees Workers 
country Male Female Male Female 
SE 232702 191187 264607 224064 
DK 133739 150221 73090 82959 
DE 293348 183547 202986 125189 
NL 182660 175320 157131 183281 
BE 345857 347238 274723 196242 
FR 273510 269698 206838 170896 
CH 263905 302608 106619 135122 
AT 358710 271720 309098 274544 
ES 226819 166949 230804 210123 
IT 319760 234593 261969 219339 
CZ 181865 196708 123052 143422 





Table 4. Gini coefficient of social security wealth, Gini coefficient of lifetime income and progressivity index by country, working 
status and gender  
 Gini_SSW Gini_LTI Progressivity Index 
Country 
Workers Retirees Workers Retirees Workers Retirees 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
SE 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.22 0.26 0.43 0.57 
DK 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.18 0.32 0.39 0.41 0.52 0.97 0.97 0.56 0.65 
DE 0.20 0.32 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.21 
NL 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.41 0.35 0.63 0.91 0.95 0.37 0.76 
BE 0.13 0.25 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.70 0.63 0.69 0.78 0.64 0.06 0.22 
FR 0.11 0.17 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.41 0.75 0.81 0.67 0.59 0.64 0.64 
CH 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.40 0.25 0.42 0.96 0.97 -0.12 0.43 
AT 0.48 0.18 0.30 0.33 0.55 0.35 0.48 0.52 0.13 0.49 0.37 0.37 
ES 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.78 0.46 0.80 0.77 0.69 0.50 0.70 0.69 
IT 0.27 0.31 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.77 0.93 0.10 0.14 0.70 0.73 
CZ 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.78 0.70 0.61 0.58 




Table 5. Quintiles of the household distributions of SSW, real assets and financial assets 
Country 
Household SSW Household real assets Household financial assets 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
SE 156.2 214.4 306.5 418.4 585.2 0.0 55.1 114.6 202.7 484.8 1.7 19 40 88.1 188 
DK 82.9 156.0 161.7 197.7 308.4 0.0 52.7 105.5 175.9 351.9 0.2 10 31 70.3 177 
DE 119.8 223.4 319.6 429.1 616.3 0.0 32.8 107.9 199.1 369.8 0.0 5.4 18.1 42.5 140.7 
NL 157.1 183.2 232.1 331.8 402.2 0.0 59.8 137.0 221.8 392.0 0.5 6.8 21.9 46.1 130.4 
BE 208.4 308.9 404.9 560.8 2447.1 0.0 151.4 216.3 262.3 454.3 1.3 16.8 44.0 105.4 285.5 
FR 156.2 239.3 324.9 442.2 753.4 0.0 144.0 219.3 306.0 515.7 0.0 6.7 23.3 62.2 180.9 
CH 135.1 241.7 279.0 397.2 548.4 0.0 43.7 131.1 267.6 626.7 0.5 20.4 58.3 145.7 365.1 
AT 201.2 294.5 404.5 537.4 712.8 0.0 27.9 72.7 158.3 315.4 0.0 2.2 7.4 20.3 55.3 
ES 133.9 179.2 249.8 330.5 468.5 40.5 113.5 162.2 253.4 461.9 0.0 0.5 5.0 10.1 53.7 
IT 152.4 255.8 347.2 454.0 688.0 6.0 110.0 177.0 309.7 531.0 0.0 2.6 8.8 22.1 58.6 
CZ 141.7 195.6 258.9 347.4 414.5 0.0 50.6 101.3 155.3 270.2 0.0 2.0 6.4 14.4 36.4 
PL 76.7 129.0 180.4 240.7 343.9 0.0 18.4 40.5 72.6 141.2 3.6 3.6 3.8 5.4 10.9 
Note: Amounts are PPP-adjusted and expressed in thousands of 2010 euros.  
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Figure 1. Distributions of social security wealth by employment status and gender 
 
Note: the continuous line represents the Kernel density. social security wealth (SSW) distributions are 






































































































































































































Figure 3. Distributions of lifetime income by employment status and gender 
 
Note: the continuous line represents the Kernel density. Lifetime income distributions are trimmed as 
indicated in the text. For improving figures readability, we additionally exclude values above the 95th 








































































































Figure 4. Country-level comparison between the progressivity index based on our 
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Figure 5. Fitted median and 95% confidence interval of the RSSW index by quintile 




Note: Fitted medians and confidence intervals are based on median regressions estimated by country and 














































































































































































Figure 6. Fitted median and 95% confidence interval of the RSSW index by quintile 




Note: Fitted medians and confidence intervals are based on median regressions estimated by country and 
































































































































































Figure 7. Country-level averages of the shares of total household wealth held in 








Table A1. Percentage of individuals receiving an old age first pillar pension who also 
receive an occupational pension benefit 
 Male Females  
country Retirees Workers Retirees Workers 
SE 73.42% 3.23% 74.33% 2.92% 
DK 41.52% 3.85% 33.86% 1.40% 
DE 33.51% 1.23% 16.93% 0.00% 
NL 84.84% 7.52% 38.69% 5.96% 
BE 4.57% 2.00% 3.27% 1.59% 
FR 3.31% 0.00% 1.05% 2.00% 
CH 69.83% 5.77% 32.50% 3.13% 
AT 15.79% 0.00% 6.40% 5.56% 
ES 3.44% 0.00% 2.30% 0.00% 
IT 3.23% 0.00% 1.05% 0.00% 
CZ 0.65% 0.00% 0.44% 0.00% 
PL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source: our computations on SHARE data; note: category 6 "Occupational survivor pension from 
your spouse or partner's job" has been excluded. 
 
Table A1 reports the proportion of individuals receiving an old age first pillar pension who 
also receive an occupational-pension benefit. Second-pillar provisions are prevalent in 
Sweden, The Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland; results from SHARE on these 
percentages are in line with what reported by other sources, such as OECD (2016). 
